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Abstract 
The ability to allow users to create online communities of interest and to share a variety of 
personal information, collectively referred to as social media, is gradually being built into an 
expanding range of applications. Some of these applications, such as computer operating 
systems, were not originally intended to collect information from the user. Thus, users may 
not be aware that their digital information is being collected. Devices such as smart 
televisions, smart cars, and even smart grids, are now collecting massive quantities of user 
data ZLWKRXWWKHXVHU¶VNQRZOHGJH 
 
Users of social media, and the internet in general, leave fragments of their activities and 
intentions behind them across an increasing range of technologies. These fragments 
collectively and passively create a hidden identity built up from metadata of which the user is 
mostly unaware. 
 
Given that the user builds this hidden identity during the normal course of their day, without 
editing elements that the user may not wish to share with others, might the passive digital 
footprint more accurately reveal the individual's genuine or authentic self than the individual 
realises? 
 
We propose that an aggregated, passively collected digital portrait of a user's unconscious but 
connected activities may reveal a more genuine view of that person's self than would be 
deduced from sources over which the user has conscious control. This more accurate and 
potentially revealing portrait of the individual requires a review of how privacy has been 
classically defined in both legal as well as ethical constructs. 
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1. The ubiquitous collection of personal data 
Akamai (2016), a global leader in content delivery systems, estimates that as of the 
first quarter in 2016 there were well over a billion internet users. Internet users now 
have access to an unprecedented range of media content as well as tapping into 
connected services that allow them to monitor and control devices attached to the 
Internet of Things [IoT]. As IoT devices are used to deliver and manage these 
services, the devices themselves are collecting usage data. Many IoT systems are not 
immediately recognizable as a connected device and are often deployed as an 
embedded or mobile application connected to the internet using a variety of wireless 
technologies, such as radio-frequency identification [RFID] and Bluetooth.  
Users of technology now feed a constant stream of personal data to dozens of 
applications and devices, either consciously by using social media and communal 
gaming or unconsciously through their interaction with their vehicles, smart 
televisions, household equipment, and cyberphysical systems [CPS] deployed in 
their community. Sadeghi et. al. (2015) QRWHWKDW³smart products do not only collect 
data during their production but also when they are deployed and used by 
customers´ZLWKWKHGDWDEHLQJVWRUHGHLWKHUE\WKHYHQGRURURQWKHGHYLFHLWVHOI 
Although exacerbated by the relatively recent explosion of IoT deployment, the 
privacy concerns surrounding ubiquitous data collection are not new. In 2007, a pair 
of researchers at The University of Texas at Austin revealed the vulnerability of 
private data, even data collected in a supposedly anonymous fashion.  Greengard  
(2008, pg. 17) states WKDW WKLV UHVHDUFK ³SURYHG WKDW LW ZDV SRVVLEOH WR LGHQWLI\
individuals among a half-million participants by using public reviews published in 
WKH,QWHUQHW0RYLH'DWDEDVH,0'EWRLGHQWLI\PRYLHUDWLQJVZLWKLQ1HWIOL[¶VGDWD
In fact, eight ratings along with dates were enough to provide 99% accuracy, 
according to the researFKHUV´. Note that this research was done 11 years ago; the 
technology has advanced considerably since that time. 
The aggregation technique used by the University of Texas researchers is known as a 
linkage attack.  A linkage attack combines individually non-sensitive or anonymized 
data with data from other records until a highly accurate aggregated profile of the 
user is assembled.   
Lawfully deployed data analytics present no less of a threat to an indiYLGXDO¶V
privacy.  Over the past couple of decades, several attempts have been made to protect 
an inGLYLGXDO¶VSHUVRQDOGDWD from data mining exposure.  In the United States, this 
type of safeguard usually falls within the scope of various governmental security 
standards or regulations such as HIPAA (2017), which protects the privacy of 
$PHULFDQV¶SHUVRQDOO\LGHQWLI\LQJKHDOWKLQIRUPDWLRQ8QIRUWXQDWHO\ WKHVHW\SHVRI
standards do not exist in many business contexts. 
Many internet users are unaware of how exposed their personal data may be. Most 
users now realize that they should protect personal data residing on their computers 
with anti-malware software and should also be leery of unsolicited email. At the 
same time, internet users have been slow to realize that every time they use an 
internet-connected device of any type, either consciously or unconsciously, a trail of 
artefacts recording that activity is left behind. Digital artifacts can include obvious, 
consciously created information, such as email, instant messaging, and social media 
posts. More insidious is unconsciously created data which includes web search 
histories, cell phone or Global Positioning System [GPS] locations, even metadata 
gleaned from commonly used office applications.  
/RFDWLRQ WUDFNLQJFDQUHYHDOPRUHDERXWDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VDFWLYLWLHV and relationships 
than simply where the person is located at any given point. As the Me and My 
Shadow website (2017) comments: 
Location data can also be used to map out your relationships with 
others. If you and another person, or other people, are in the same place 
at specific times of the day, it's possible to infer what relationships you 
have with these people - if, for example, they are co-workers, lovers, 
roommates, or family members.  
Or, to take another example, if you are a government employee and are 
in the same cafe as a specific journalist, you could be flagged as a 
leaker.  
Location data is collected by a myriad of devices and sensors. Mobile phones log 
location information and can easily serve as a GPS device. Mobile location services 
use the GPS chip in the phone which then communicates with standard GPS 
satellites. This type of tracking leaves a range of artefacts that are accessible to 
anyone or anything, such as phone apps, that have access to the device. Mobile 
devices that are capable of connecting to Wi-Fi collect additional location artefacts 
and keep logs of all the locations where the device connected to Wi-Fi, giving an 
even more detailed picture of where the device has been. 
2. Examples of unconsciously provided personal data 
During an average internet session, a user may be asked several times by an array of 
entities to provide personal data for a variety of reasons.  Perhaps a user is asked to 
provide a valid name and address to a website to make a purchase, or the user may 
have to provide an e-mail address to another website to subscribe to a newsletter. 
These are examples of providing information consciously, but a rapidly increasing 
percentage of personal data is now collected unconsciously. 
A growing number of online entities that were originally designed as social media 
platforms are evolving into large scale data analytics sites. In this trend, the social 
media serves as a front end for users while the genuine purpose of the site is to 
gather personal information both consciously and unconsciously. Drachen et. al. 
(2012) note that free-to-play [F2P] games provided by Facebook and Google Play 
aid their ability to analyse player behaviours. This analysis in turn increases potential 
monetization by understanding player interaction with the games. Ahmad and 
Srivastava (2014) state that the immersive nature of online gaming environments 
encourages players to engage with the game, revealing a range of behaviours, such as 
cooperation or deceit. Given the exposure of player characteristics, these gaming 
environments provide unprecedented opportunities for studying human behaviour in 
a granular fashion. 
Chen et. al. (2015) provide an overview of an even more widespread and invasive 
vector of unconsciously provided personal information. The Internet of Things 
integrates classically networked industrial objects with a massive number of personal 
objects such as household video cameras and smart televisions. While clustering 
behavioural patterns can provide general insight into object usage, using the public 
internet as a transmission conduit makes identifying individual users of objects 
relatively trivial. 
Another major source of unconsciously provided personal information resides in 
mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets. Most cell phones manufactured 
ZLWKLQWKHODVWIRXURUILYH\HDUVDOORZWKHKDQGVHWWRVZLWFKEHWZHHQ³:L-)L´,(((
802.11 standard) and cellular radio signals. While 1st and 2nd generation cellular 
signal is relatively impervious to useful interception, 3rd generation signal is 
somewhat more vulnerable. Given that 3rd generation signal [3G] enhances the 
ability to transmit data as well as voice, the potential for extracting unconsciously 
provided personal information from both signal as well as device storage becomes 
obvious. Goda et. al. (2015) outline the various types of information available on a 
mobile device and the methods for data extraction from both signal transmission and 
the handset. Among the types of information that can reside in a smartphone, Casey 
(2011) describes: 
Although compact, these handheld devices can contain personal 
information including call history, text messages, e-mails, digital 
photographs, videos, calendar items, memos, address books, 
passwords, and credit card numbers. These devices can be used to 
communicate, exchange photographs, connect to social networks, 
blog, take notes, record and consume video and audio, sketch, 
access the Internet, and much more. As the technology develops, 
higher data transmission rates are allowing individuals to transfer 
more data (e.g., digital video), and the computing power in these 
devices enables us to use them in much the same way as we used 
laptop systems over the past decade. Because these devices fit in a 
pocket or bag, they are often carried wherever a person goes and 
FDQ EH XVHG WR GHWHUPLQH D SHUVRQ¶V ZKHUHDERXWV DW D SDUWLFXODU
time. 
Insel (2017) comments on other human characteristics that may be derived from 
mobile device use. The author notes that the manner in which a device is used, 
including typing and scrolling patterns, can be used to deduce a range of behavioural 
aspects. Keyboard interaction with a mobile device can reveal the subject's reaction 
time, attention span, and memory reliability. This data can then be used to deduce the 
user's behavioural tendencies, cognition, and even mood at the time of use. 
3. Integrating data analytics with digital forensics 
Digital forensics, data analytics, and linkage attacks share many of the same 
techniques for aggregating data to form a profile of a user, varying mostly by intent 
of use. Digital forensics is an extension of traditional evidence gathering and is 
associated with the investigation of data found on a variety of devices and networks. 
Data analytics is not necessarily concerned with identification of an individual or that 
SHUVRQ¶VDFWLYLWLHVEXW LV UDWKHUDPHDQVRIGHULYLQJSDWWHUQVDQGUHODWLRQVKLSV IURP
large data sets i.e. Big Data /LQNDJH DWWDFNV FDQ EH GHILQHG DV WKH ³GH-
DQRQ\PL]DWLRQ´ RI GDWD SURYLGHG E\ RU DERXW DQ LQGLYLGXDO GHULYHG E\ DQDO\VLng 
data relationships contained in two or more unrelated databases. Merener (2012, pg. 
378) comments that anonymization typically removes "the variables that uniquely 
associate records to the corresponding individuals, such as name, email address, 
social security number". The author then notes that this step is insufficient to prevent 
algorithmic linkage of other variables in the data that can still serve as a type of 
digital fingerprint. 
 
Shen et. al. (2014) discuss a more targeted type of linkage attack, D ³8VHU ,GHQWLW\
/LQNDJH$WWDFN´ZKLFKFDQOLQNDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VLQIRUPDWLRQDFURVVDUDQJHRIRQOLQH
social networks. When data analytics and/or linkage attack methods are combined 
with digital forensics, the raw data derived by use of forensic techniques can then be 
analysed with a high degree of accuracy regarding the identity and activities of the 
individual under analysis. In addition, because a major goal of digital forensics is to 
provide nonrepudiation of evidence, the resulting profile gained by combining these 
tools is unlikely to have been modified by the individual, which lends a greater 
degree of veracity to the profile. 
 
Digital forensics adhere to the legal rules of evidence as practiced in the location 
where the forensics operation takes place. Traditionally, digital forensics has been 
used to collect data that a suspect may have stored on physical media, such as a hard 
GULYH :KHUH GLJLWDO IRUHQVLFV EHJLQ WR UDLVH FRQFHUQV UHJDUGLQJ DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V
passive digital footprint is when it is combined with sensor data provided by IoT 
devices. Caviglione et. al. (2017) note that common types of IoT implementations 
create an intersection between the digital world and the physical world through the 
use of sensors. The authors state: 
 
For example, IoT nodes can provide evidence of when a person 
was present in a room by investigating in-door presence sensor 
values. Obviously, such investigations are linked to further privacy 
issues, especially as sensors might be influenced not only by a 
single user but by an undefined set of influencers: several 
individuals could trigger a presence sensor in a room each day, not 
just the potential criminal. 
 
This blurring of personal data as it exists in the digital world with its physical 
counterpart allows the investigator to assemble an extremely accurate portrait of a 
suspect. If this portrait were placed in the hands of a corporate or governmental 
entity, the privacy implications are disturbing. 
 4. Does unconsciously provided personal information reveal the 
³DXWKHQWLFVHOI´" 
Users of social media consciously craft an online identity and may compile a set of 
GLIIHULQJLGHQWLWLHVEDVHGRQZKDWWKHXVHUSHUFHLYHVDVGLIIHUHQWDXGLHQFHV0DWLF¶V  
(2011, pg. 20) UHVHDUFK LQGLFDWHV WKDW ³users constantly assess their online 
environment and based on their assessment they construct their own Internet 
playground where they choose roles they find suitable´ 6R ZKDW ZRXOG
unconsciously provided personal information reveal about an individual? Linking 
and analysing relationships betZHHQ DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V GLIIHULQJ VHOI-constructed 
LGHQWLWLHV ZRXOG SURYLGH LQVLJKWV LQWR WKDW LQGLYLGXDO¶V FRQVFLRXVO\ SURYLGHG VHOI-
perception. If unconsciously provided personal information is added to that analysis, 
as is commonly done in digital forensics, the elements of intent, motivation, and 
exposure of deception come into play. 
5. Discussion 
Williams and Neal (2012) point out the similarities in technique between data mining 
and linkage attacks, stating that both types of information gathering and analysis 
pose a similar risk of personal data exposure. When digital forensics techniques are 
added, the combination of consciously and unconsciously generated data makes 
LGHQWLI\LQJDQLQGLYLGXDODQGWKDWLQGLYLGXDO¶VDFWLYLWLHVEHKDYLRXUVDQGPRWLYDWLRQ
relatively straightforward. 
Analysis RI D MRE FDQGLGDWH¶V VRFLDO PHGLD LQIRUPDWLRQ KDV EHFRPH DQ DFFHSWHG
practice for human resource departments in the United States.  Data analytics is also 
increasingly used by educational institutions to guide students toward courses and 
subjects where they may have a greater chance of academic success, based on their 
individual characteristics as revealed by the data. As Johnson (2014) notes, there are 
LQKHUHQWHWKLFDOGLOHPPDV LQ WKLV W\SHRI³WHFKQRVRFLDO´ V\VWHPZKLch can include 
UHGXFLQJDQ LQGLYLGXDO¶VDXWRQRP\RYHU WKHLURZQDJJUHJDWHGSURILOH3LVWLOOL et. al. 
(2014) go further to state that acting on insights gained from data analytics presents 
the possibility of social engineering, which may or may not be advantageous or 
helpful to the individual whose data is analysed. 
The use of continually refined data analytics, combined with the possible inclusion 
of digital forensics to add unconsciously provided data to the digital profile, provides 
a path to discovering more about an individual than would be uncovered through 
consciously provided information. Indeed, the combined data would likely provide 
GHHSHU LQVLJKW LQWR DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V FKDUDFWHULVWLFV PRWLYDWLRQV DQG DFWLRQV WKDQ
personal introspection might reveal7KLVDELOLW\WRWUDFNDSHUVRQ¶VDFWLRQVDFURVVD
broad range of devices is unparalleled in history. The unguarded nature of much of 
WKLVGDWDSURYLGHVDQXQSUHFHGHQWHGRSSRUWXQLW\WRREVHUYHDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VEHKDYLRXU
in a deeper manner than has ever been possible before. 
Fairfield and Shtein (2014, pg. 39) state "[t]he nature of big data technology 
fundamentally challenges traditional methods of framing ethical principles". The 
traditional ethical and legal definitions of privacy are no longer sufficient for dealing 
with the overwhelming quantity and detail of personal data being generated by 
individuals both consciously and unconsciously. The changing nature of Big Data 
and the resulting analytically derived information will require legislators and 
businesses to develop more flexible and sophisticated ethical constructs to deal with 
the sheer quantity of personal data available, as well as the minefield of revelation 
embedded within that data. 
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